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The main purpose of this article is to address the
question of whether the world can feed itself
during the twenty-first century. The article starts
with a brief review of the chief demographic effects
of famines – with special reference to their possible
practical significance. It then considers so-called
‘neo-Malthusian’ dimensions of famines – in
particular, the widespread notion that population
growth may outpace growth in the global food
supply. The authors dismiss such concerns for the
near term future, but contend that in certain
respects, population growth and population scale
may be of considerable significance apropos the risk
of future famines – especially if cognisance is taken
of issues of global sustainability and the longer run.
For reasons of efficiency the following arguments
are largely arranged in point form.
1 Demographic effects of famines
The demographic consequences of famines are
often unappreciated; indeed they are sometimes
quite unknown. Accordingly it is worth noting the
main effects (see also Dyson and Ó Gráda 2002).
1. Mortality usually – although not always –
increases during times of famine. And, especially
in environments where there is a heavy
infectious disease load and/or considerable
weather seasonality (e.g. as regards temperature
and rainfall), famine mortality usually involves
an amplification of the ‘normal’ seasonal
distribution of deaths. Increased undernutrition
is the principal underlying cause of famine
mortality – reflecting lack of access to food
among some (or, rarely, all) of the population.
However, in many famines infectious diseases
are responsible for the bulk of famine deaths.
Famines and epidemics frequently interact
synergistically with one another – for example,
conditions of famine (e.g. mass wandering and
congregation) contributing to the spread of
infectious diseases, and epidemics disrupting
agricultural operations. The largest number of
famine deaths are generally young children.
Male mortality almost always increases by more
than that of females. Famine mortality tends to
vary inversely with socio-economic status.
2. The build-up of famine conditions invariably
causes a lagged decline (lag of about nineIDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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months duration) in births. Social and
psychological factors contribute to fertility
decline in most famines; biological factors (e.g.
anovulation) tend to operate only in the most
severe crises. However, soon after a famine
there is often a short-term increase – i.e. a
rebound – in births.
3. Migration is a feature of most famines. People
move in search of food and/or work. However,
through various mechanisms migration can
have a positive or a negative effect upon the
level of mortality – for the migrants, for those
they leave behind, and therefore for the
population as a whole. For example, migrants
may find food or work, or succumb to disease;
those they leave behind may benefit from there
being fewer mouths to feed, or they may die of
an infectious disease carried back when the
migrants return home. That said, as economies
have tended to become more diverse over time,
and transport and communications have
generally improved, so in many famines
migration has probably had an increasingly
beneficial effect upon the overall level of
mortality (i.e. it has reduced mortality below
what it would otherwise have been).
4. Because famines tend to kill young children
especially (and often the elderly), post-famine
population age structures usually have
proportionally more people aged 10–45 than
applied pre-famine. Post-famine populations
are usually slightly more feminine than applied
pre-famine (because more males die). These
considerations tend to boost the birth rate for
several years following the famine – so
speeding demographic recovery.
2 Some implications
1. Of course, our main concern must be with
limiting famine mortality. In this context, it is
clear that famines which do not involve major
outbreaks of infectious diseases can and do
occur – a well documented case being the
Greek islands during the early 1940s (see
Hionidou 2002). 
2. However, in the contemporary ‘developing’
world infectious diseases are often implicated
heavily in famine mortality. Therefore, in any
particular situation it is important to know just
what the main infectious diseases are. Relatedly,
vital registration data can sometimes provide a
reasonable guide as to the ‘usual’ seasonal
distribution of mortality – and therefore such
data may help efforts to limit the total volume of
famine deaths. In this context, it is worth noting
that in many developing countries deaths tend
to peak during and soon after the rains.
3. A final point which arises clearly from the
available demographic time series, is that
famines often come in pairs. We call these
‘bang/bang’ famines. Various ‘knock-on’
mechanisms can be involved – e.g. through
synergistic interactions with epidemics, or
through the eating of precious seed-corn.
However, an associated practical point is to
stress the importance of vigilance.
3 Population growth and famines
1. Famines can have several different causes, at
several different levels. For example, we might
distinguish between ‘underlying’ causes and
more proximate ‘triggers’. However, apropos the
former, Thomas Robert Malthus argued
famously in 1798 that if for some reason a
population were to grow at a fair pace for an
extended period of time – and assuming that
the supply of cropland was ultimately fixed –
then one of the ways in which some kind of
balance between its increased size and the food
supply might be restored was through the
occurrence of a famine and a rise in the death
rate. The role of famines in restoring some kind
of rough equilibrium between the size of a
population and its food supply was only one
part of Malthus’ argument. And it was not new
– either in Europe or beyond. Indeed, many
people regarded it as incontrovertible.
2. In fact, there is little doubt that historically
famines did constitute a significant check upon
the growth of populations in some places at
some times (Saito 2002). This was certainly
true for much of Europe and Asia. That said,
the degree to which increases in population
contributed to the causation of famines would
have been variable. Other things being equal,
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however, the larger was the population the
greater would have been the number of famine
deaths.
3. It is ironic that scientific, technological and
economic changes which really got underway
during Malthus’ own lifetime – i.e. in the last
part of the eighteenth century and the early
part of the nineteenth – made it possible to
increase food availability in Europe above what
was required by extended population growth,
really for the very first time. However, it is
sweeping – and unfair – to dismiss Malthus’
arguments as ‘wrong’.
4. Recently, so-called neo-Malthusian writers, like
Paul Ehrlich and Lester Brown, have argued
that the scale of demographic growth in the
modern world will outstrip the capacity to
produce food, and that there will be increasing
famines and massive mortality as a result (see
Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990; Brown 1996).
5. So far, their predictions have not been borne
out. Most analysts who have considered the
situation believe that over a future time horizon
of, e.g. the next 20–25 years, it should be
possible to raise average levels of food
production faster than the projected
demographic growth in most world regions
(e.g. see Alexandratos 1999; Johnson 1999;
Dyson 1999; McCalla and Revoredo 2001).
That said, when discussing famine risks in the
twenty-first century, there are some very
important technical, environmental and
demographic considerations which – while it
may sometimes be convenient to do so –
cannot be ignored. Certainly, social scientists
need to evince a little more humility when
contemplating the issue. Several of these
considerations are addressed now.
6. The challenge facing the world is not just a
matter of food distribution (and it should not
be dismissed as such). While distributional
matters are important, those relating to
production are at least as important.
Looking at the period to the year 2025,
population growth will be by far the most
important reason why more cereals will be
required in most of Africa and Asia. For
example, population projections for India
suggest that the country’s population will rise by
more than half a billion. Although major
famines seem to be events of the past for India,
it is clear that food output will need to be
increased commensurately (and, of course,
hopefully by more). This may be possible, but it
certainly will not be easy and it will still leave the
average Indian diet at a pretty dismal level,
whether gauged in nutritional or culinary terms.
7. Most analyses suggest that while at the world
level the expansion of cereal production should
be able to keep pace with demand (the bulk of
it coming from population growth), this will
often not be the case at the world regional level.
In other words, there is likely to be an increase
in the world cereal trade informed, in part, by
the fact that some countries will probably have
difficulties in raising their cereal output at rates
which match their demographically generated
increase in demand. For example, many
countries in the Middle East are already highly
dependent upon cereal imports to make their
current diets possible. This will be even more
true in the future – unless dietary patterns are
radically altered (e.g. if there are sharp falls in
the consumption of meat).
8. Most analyses see a particularly dismal food
future for most of sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. see
Alexandratos 1995; Dyson 1999; Mitchell et al.
1997). While the problems of this region are
many and complex, few believe that rapid
demographic growth – with populations often
doubling in less than 25 years and then
doubling again – has helped the situation.
While the statistical data on agriculture are
poor, average cereal yields in the region have
probably not increased by much, and food
output has been raised mostly by increasing the
harvested area (often with deleterious
consequences for soil fertility and the wider
environment).
The general conclusion is that sub-Saharan
Africa may do well just to maintain its current
levels of per capita food consumption in the face
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of population growth. Now, especially in the
south and east of the region, most problems are
being massively compounded by HIV/AIDS.
Today over 20 million people in sub-Saharan
Africa are HIV-positive. Though HIV/AIDS may
dampen population growth, its impact on
household demographic profiles and on labour
productivity and the high cost of prevention
and treatment will tend to reduce living
standards in the region. The International
Monetary Fund (2002) estimates that the
pandemic may reduce income per capita in the
region by as much as 0.7 per cent in the current
decade (see also de Waal, in this Bulletin).
9. Water for agriculture is already a huge problem
in much of the developing world and
population growth will make it worse.
Burgeoning urban populations and increasing
water requirements for industrial and other
purposes are placing increasing demands on
national water supplies. Of course, policy
changes can help ease the situation – for
example, water is a resource which increasingly
will have to be priced. However, while
necessary, such changes can only go so far. The
same applies to various technical innovations
(e.g. irrigation, rainwater harvesting and water
recycling).
Ultimately, water is a resource which cannot be
conjured up from thin air. In the context of the
risk of future famines it is worth recalling how
critical a lack of water often is in many famine
situations. Poor water quality often exacerbates
the problems caused by water shortages.
Famine consequences – especially as they
pertain to mortality from diseases like cholera
and dysentery – can relate at least as much to
shortages of water as to a lack of food.
10. While it seems likely that (sub-Saharan Africa
and parts of the Middle East apart) most
developing countries will be able to grow most
of the extra food they need to feed their
increasing populations, it is worth stating that
this will not be done – indeed it cannot be done
– without significant increases in the use of
synthetic nitrogen. As Vaclav Smil (1997)
points out, land-scarce, high population
density countries (e.g. China, Egypt,
Bangladesh) already depend upon chemical
fertilisers ‘for their very existence’. Inevitably,
this will be even more true in the future.
Indeed, a strong case can be made that in the
absence of the Haber-Bosch process for the
synthesis of ammonia, famines would have been
operating to restore some kind of balance
between population growth and food supplies
throughout the period since 1950 (the main
alternative would have been much faster fertility
declines). Today, approximately 2 billion of the
Earth’s inhabitants are alive because of the
proteins in their bodies built with nitrogen
coming from the Haber-Bosch process; and this
will be just as true for the billions – currently put
at about three – that will come during the next
few decades (Smil 1997: 63).
11. Raising average levels of food availability is a
different matter from reducing the total number
of hungry people in the world. Most
population growth in recent decades has
happened – and in future decades will happen
– in poor regions like South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. These are regions where
sizeable fractions of the population are
undernourished. Consequently, FAO estimates
that the total number of undernourished people
in the world fell only modestly between
1969–71 and 1996–8 – from around 941 to
about 826 million (Alexandratos 1995; FAO
2000), during which time the world
population increased by over 2 billion. Other
things being equal, this same basic fact will
make it harder to reduce the total number of
hungry (and poor) people in the next few
decades; and these are those most vulnerable to
famine.
However distant issues of family planning may
seem to those engaged in food and agricultural
matters, there is no doubt that demographic
growth is the most important factor underlying
the growth of world cereal demand. Now that
we have entered the twenty-first century,
people everywhere should have access to safe,
affordable and effective methods of
contraception. Children should be by choice,
not chance. Yet levels of ‘unmet need’ for family
planning are often large.
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12. Finally, it would be wrong to deny that there may
well be major issues of long-run sustainability for
the global food system. The aforementioned
conclusion – that it should be possible to raise
food production faster than population growth
in most regions – is good to have, but also
limited.
Perhaps the greatest uncertainties derive from
the combination of just how many of us
humans there are and what many of us are
doing, particularly in our use of energy –
especially petroleum, gas and coal. Although
no one knows for sure, this combination may
pose massive threats, e.g. climate change and
sea level rise – the consequences of which will
surely be greatest for the world’s poor.
In this context, the period since 1950 has seen
a considerable, long-run rise in cereal harvest
variability in two of the world’s major regions
(Dyson 1996: 88). The first is North America –
which is the main source of cereal exports for
importing countries like those in the Middle
East. If the trend of weather induced
reductions in cereal harvests in North America
continues then this could have serious
implications for the grain prices which poor
countries pay. The second region includes the
eastern and southern areas of sub-Saharan
Africa where, again, the trend towards
increasing cereal harvest variability since 1950
is both marked and sustained. Recall 1983,
1984 and 1992? Perhaps no one should really
be surprised by the current severe drought in
the region, which is contributing to conditions
of famine, for example, in Malawi and Zambia.
13. In conclusion, when we were born the world’s
population was about 2.5 billion. It has more
than doubled since. Today, it is about 6.2
billion and rising. Birth rates are falling in most
countries, but the population will be
approaching 8 billion by 2025.
The United Nations has recently revised its
medium estimate for 2050 upwards by 413
million – because fertility rates are falling
significantly slower than was previously
expected. To quote Jack Caldwell (2002: 11):
‘The immediate challenge is to maintain some
of the attitudes, policies and expenditure
patterns that have so far sustained the
developing world’s fertility decline. If this does
not happen, then slow or stationary population
growth may be attained not with 8 billion
people, but with 9, 10, 11 or 12 billion. The
differences in long-term environmental
sustainability could be huge’ [emphasis added].
14. What is the relevance of all this to famines?
While they have been on the decline during
recent decades, it would be foolish to rule out
the chances of massive famines over the longer
run. Indeed, if we adopt a sufficiently long time
horizon, then a famine of this type will almost
certainly occur. Continuing population growth
means that the numbers of people requiring
relief will be very much greater than in the
past. A significant sudden alteration in the
world’s climate – due either to anthropogenic
or other causes (e.g. a major volcanic eruption)
– would probably produce major declines in
food availability, with the very gravest
implications for the world’s poor.
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